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REAL ESTATE LAW
Richard W. Gregory *
Lindsey Dobbs Chase **
I. INTRODUCTION
It is our hope that this article represents a balanced survey of
recent developments in real property law in the Commonwealth
of Virginia arising out of both significant judicial decisions and
legislative acts. Like the previous real estate law article pub-
lished in the 2006 Annual SurueyZ this article's scope also spans
two years of judicial opinions and two sessions of the Virginia
General Assembly. This article covers judicial opinions from 2006
to 2008, and the 2007 and 2008 sessions of the Virginia General
Assembly.
II. SIGNIFICANT JUDICIAL HOLDINGS
A. Constitutional Claims
1. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
In Jones v. Flowers, the Supreme Court of the United States
considered the parameters of the United States Constitution's
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as it applies to the
notice requirements for a government sale of real property on the
basis of delinquent taxes.2 As the property owner no longer re-
sided at the subject property in Jones, multiple delinquency no-
* Chairman, Gregory Kaplan, PLC, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1983, Marshall-Wythe
School of Law, College of William and Mary; B.A., 1980, University of Virginia.
** Associate, Gregory Kaplan, PLC, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2005, University of
Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2002, University of Virginia.
1. Paul H. Davenport & Lindsey H. Dobbs, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Real Es-
tate Law, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 257 (2006).
2. 547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006).
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tices addressed to the property went unclaimed.3 In addition to
the foregoing notices, the State of Arkansas published notice in
the local newspaper. 4
Quoting from Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
the Court reiterated the rule that due process consists of 'notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise in-
terested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections."'5 After considering the
facts at hand, the Court reasoned, "We do not think that a person
who actually desired to inform a real property owner of an im-
pending tax sale of a house he owns would do nothing when a cer-
tified letter sent to the owner is returned unclaimed."6 The Court
went on to outline several reasonable steps that would have been
appropriate for the State to take prior to effectuating the tax sale,
including following up certified letters with regular mail, posting
notice on the front door, and addressing undeliverable mail to
"occupant."7 Seeming to chastise the State for its actions, the
Court held that "when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned un-
claimed, the State must take additional reasonable steps to at-
tempt to provide notice to the property owner before selling his
property, if it is practicable to do so."8
Chief Justice Roberts, who authored the majority opinion, as-
serted that the Jones holding did not represent a departure from
its previous holdings in Mullane and Dusenberry v. United
States.9 The Chief Justice defended the Jones holding as merely
addressing a "new wrinkle," i.e., the circumstance "when the gov-
ernment becomes aware prior to the taking that its attempt at
notice has failed."1o Justice Thomas penned a lengthy dissent, fo-
cusing largely on the State's interest in efficiently managing its
administrative system, and characterizing the majority's reason-
3. Id. at 223-24.
4. Id. at 224.
5. Id. at 226 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950)).
6. Id. at 229.
7. Id. at 234-35.
8. Id. at 225.
9. Id. at 238 (citing Dusenberry v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 171 (2002); Mullane,
339 U.S. at 315)).
10. Id. at 227.
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able steps as "constitutionally unnecessary ... burdensome, im-
practical, and no more likely to effect notice than the methods ac-
tually employed by the State."11 Apparently having little sympa-
thy for the property owner's plight, Justice Thomas reasoned that
Arkansas was free to "indulge the assumption" that [the property
owner] had either provided the state taxing authority with a correct
and up-to-date mailing address-as required by state law-"or that
he... left some caretaker under a duty to let him know that [his
property was] being jeopardized." 12
2. Fourth Amendment Protection Against Unreasonable
Seizures
In Presley v. City of Charlottesville, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit sought to determine whether a
landowner could bring a claim under the Fourth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution on the basis of an unreasonable seizure.13
The parties charged with the purported constitutional rights vi-
olation were the city of Charlottesville, Virginia, and the Rivanna
Trails Foundation.14 Together, they published and distributed a
trail map depicting a public trail through the landowner's private
property, which they continued to distribute even after learning
that a trail depicted on the map crossed over the private proper-
ty.15 Although the city and the foundation endeavored to acquire
an easement for the trail from the private property owner, Pres-
ley refused to grant the easement. 16 She then took measures,
such as installing razor wire, to deter trespassing.17 In response,
the city revised a local ordinance "to prohibit Presley's protective
measures" and then criminally prosecuted her for the violation.1S
11. Id. at 246 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 242-43 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316).
13. 464 F.3d 480, 482-83 (4th Cir. 2006).
14. Id. at 482.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 483.
18. Id.
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Presley then brought suit claiming an unlawful seizure. 19 The
district court dismissed her unreasonable seizure claim, citing a
two-fold basis: (1) failure to state a claim, and (2) lack of a com-
plete deprivation of possessory property interests.20 To begin, the
Fourth Circuit analyzed the interplay between the Fourth
Amendment's protection against seizure and the Fifth Amend-
ment's prohibition against takings, it ultimately determined that
Presley's possible additional takings claim did not foreclose her
unreasonable seizure claim.21 The Fourth Circuit also disagreed
with the lower court's complete deprivation requirement, con-
tending instead that "a deprivation need not be [that] severe to
constitute a seizure subject to constitutional protections."22 On
the contrary, the Fourth Circuit cited the Supreme Court of the
United States for the propositions that the Fourth Amendment
extends to temporary or partial seizures and that the determina-
tive question is whether 'there is some meaningful interference
with an individual's possessory interests in that property."' 23
Considering the facts, the court was persuaded that the "regu-
lar presence of a veritable army of trespassers who freely and
regularly traverse her yard, littering, making noise, damaging
her land, and occasionally even camping overnight" constituted
sufficiently "'meaningful interference. "'24 Relying heavily on
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,25 in which the go-
vernmental entity 'did more than adopt a passive attitude to-
ward the underlying private conduct,"' the Fourth Circuit was not
deterred by the fact that the interference was the result of private
individuals, and the court attributed the conduct of the private
citizens to the governmental entities. 26
19. Id.
20. Id. at 484, 487.
21. Id. at 484-87.
22. Id. at 487.
23. Id. (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
24. Id.
25. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
26. Presley, 464 F.3d at 487-88 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615).
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B. Eminent Domain
In Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner v. Target
Corp., the Supreme Court of Virginia declined to expand the
scope of damages available in conjunction with condemnation
proceedings. 27 The Commissioner condemned a portion of the
property owner's parcel for the purpose of building a public
road.28 The property owner, a "big box" retailer in Northern Vir-
ginia, sought $4,600,000 in damages to the residue of the parcel
citing a "loss of visibility" resulting from a change in the traffic
pattern and the construction of privacy barriers. 29 The lower
court awarded the retailer $175,100 in compensation for the con-
demned portion of property and over $3,000,000 in damages at-
tributable to the residue.30
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the judgment of the
lower court.31 The court cited procedural grounds for its holding
and expressly qualified its ruling by noting: "We observe, howev-
er, that we do not decide whether a landowner, whose real prop-
erty is the subject of a condemnation proceeding, may recover
damages for loss of visibility to the residue of the real property.
This issue remains undecided in this Commonwealth." 32 Not-
withstanding the foregoing caveat, it may be telling that the Tar-
get Court declined the opportunity to set aside the damage award
as excessive.33 The court concluded that the Commissioner "failed
to establish that the report of the jurors is so excessive as to show
prejudice or corruption."34
C. Nuisance
1. Remedies
In a case relevant to lawyers and laymen alike, Fancher v. Fa-
gella, the Supreme Court of Virginia reconsidered the availability
27. 274 Va. 341, 353-54, 650 S.E.2d 92, 99 (2007).
28. Id. at 344, 650 S.E.2d at 94.
29. Id. at 345-46, 650 S.E.2d at 94-95.
30. Id. at 344, 650 S.E.2d at 94.
31. Id. at 353, 650 S.E.2d at 99.
32. Id. at 353-54, 650 S.E.2d at 99.
33. Id. at 353, 650 S.E.2d at 98.
34. Id., 650 S.E.2d at 99.
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of injunctive relief when a property owner alleges nuisance based
on the intrusion of a neighbor's tree. 35 In Fancher, the complain-
ing property owner sought to compel the removal of his neighbor's
tree, contending that the tree's root system had damaged a re-
taining wall, patio, and his home's foundation, and that the tree's
branches had damaged his roof and gutters. 36 Though he exer-
cised self-help by removing the roots and branches, they contin-
ued to grow back.37
The supreme court took the opportunity to reverse its long-
standing rule of law from Smith v. Holt,38 known as the "Virginia
Rule."39 Under the Virginia Rule, "intrusion[s] of roots and
branches from a neighbor's plantings which [are] 'not noxious in
[their] nature' and [have] caused no 'sensible injury' [are] not ac-
tionable at law, the plaintiff being limited to his right of self-
help."40 Abandoning the Virginia Rule, the supreme court rea-
soned that "continued reliance on the distinction between plants
that are 'noxious,' and those that are not, imposes an unworkable
standard for determining the rights of neighboring landown-
ers."41
The Fancher Court considered, but ultimately rejected, both
the "Massachusetts Rule" and the "Restatement Rule."42 Under
the Massachusetts Rule, "a landowner's right to protect his prop-
erty from the encroaching boughs and roots of a neighbor's tree is
limited to self-help, i.e., cutting off the branches and roots at the
point they invade his property."43 Similarly, the Restatement
Rule "imposes an obligation on a landowner to control vegetation
that encroaches upon adjoining land if the encroaching vegetation
is 'artificial,' i.e., planted or maintained by a person, but not if the
encroaching vegetation is 'natural."'44 Instead, the supreme court
adopted the "Hawaii Rule," which provides:
35. 274 Va. 549, 552, 650 S.E.2d 519, 520 (2007).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 174 Va. 213, 5 S.E.2d 492 (1939).
39. See Fancher, 274 Va. 555-56, 650 S.E.2d at 522.
40. Id. at 554, 650 S.E.2d at 521 (quoting Smith, 174 Va. at 219-20, 5 S.E.2d at 495).
41. Id. at 555, 650 S.E.2d at 522.
42. Id. at 554-55, 650 S.E.2d at 521-22.
43. Id. at 554, 650 S.E.2d at 521.
44. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 839, 840 (1979)).
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[E]ncroaching trees and plants are not nuisances merely because
they cast shade, drop leaves, flowers, or fruit, or just because they
happen to encroach upon adjoining property either above or below
the ground. However, encroaching trees and plants may be regarded
as a nuisance when they cause actual harm or pose an imminent
danger of actual harm to adjoining property. If so, the owner of the
tree or plant may be held responsible for harm caused to [adjoining
property], and may also be required to cut back the encroaching
branches or roots, assuming the encroaching vegetation constitutes a
nuisance. We do not, however, alter existing... law that the adjoin-
ing landowner may, at his own expense, cut away the encroaching
vegetation to the property line whether or not the encroaching vege-
tation constitutes a nuisance or is otherwise causing harm or possi-
ble harm to the adjoining property. Thus, the law of self-help re-
mains intact .... 45
The supreme court therefore remanded the case to the trial
court to consider whether equitable relief was appropriate in light
of its new rule of law.46
2. Clean Hands Doctrine
In Cline v. Berg, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered the
application of the "clean hands" doctrine in regard to a claim for
nuisance based upon the erection of a 32-foot high, 200-foot long
fence.47 The neighboring parties in Cline had a history of disa-
greements. 48 Prior to the fence's construction, Berg, the party
seeking to establish the fence as a nuisance, installed flood lights
described as "'someone having their high beams on their car shin-
ing them towards the house,"' as well as surveillance cameras
which captured the Clines' movements and interfered with their
television reception. 49 In a series of letters from their attorney,
the Clines formally requested that Berg redirect the lights and
cameras. 50 Upon Berg's refusal, they constructed the fence in or-
der to deflect Berg's various installations. 51 Siding with Berg, the
circuit court characterized the fence as "'an ugly scar on a beauti-
45. Id. at 555-56, 650 S.E.2d at 522 (quoting Lane v. W.J. Curry & Sons, 92 S.W.3d
355, 364 (Tenn. 2002)).
46. Id. at 557, 650 S.E.2d at 523.
47. 273 Va. 142, 143-44, 639 S.E.2d 231, 231 (2007).
48. Id. at 144, 639 S.E.2d at 231-32.
49. Id., 639 S.E.2d at 232.
50. Id. at 145, 639 S.E.2d at 232.
51. Id., 639 S.E.2d at 232-33.
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ful area,"' concluded that it was a private nuisance, and ordered
its removal. 52
The Clines argued on appeal that the circuit court had abused
its discretion by failing to apply the doctrine of clean hands.53
The supreme court described the doctrine as 'an ancient maxim
of equity courts,"' which provides that '[h]e who comes into equi-
ty must come with clean hands."'54 The rationale behind the doc-
trine is that:
"[T]he complainant seeking equitable relief must not himself have
been guilty of any inequitable or wrongful conduct with respect to
the transaction or subject matter sued on. Equity will not give relief
to one seeking to restrain or enjoin a tortious act where he has him-
self been guilty of fraud, illegality, tortious conduct or the like in re-
spect of the same matter in litigation."5 5
Furthermore, "[a]pplication of the doctrine turns upon the facts of
each particular case and is therefore left to the sound discretion
of the fact finder."56 In light of the circuit court's finding that the
fence would not have been erected but for the conduct of Berg, the
supreme court found that the circuit court abused its discretion in
refusing to apply the doctrine. 57 The Cline Court further rejected
Berg's contention that the application of the doctrine in this in-
stance would be inequitable or violate public policy, noting that
"[a] court of equity 'will not relieve against conditions brought
about by the improper conduct of the party seeking relief."'58
Whether the fence was a nuisance was irrelevant to the supreme
court because "Berg was not 'free from reproach in his conduct."' 59
D. Zoning
In Goyonaga v. Board of Zoning Appeals, the Supreme Court of
Virginia considered whether the prior grant of a variance as to
52. Id. at 146-47, 639 S.E.2d at 233.
53. Id. at 147, 639 S.E.2d at 233.
54. Id. (quoting Richards v. Musselman, 221 Va. 181, 185 & n.1, 267 S.E.2d 164, 166
& n.1 (1980)).
55. Id., 639 S.E.2d at 233-34 (quoting Richards, 221 Va. at 185 n.1, 267 S.E.2d at
166-67 n.1).
56. Id. at 148, 639 S.E.2d at 234 (quoting Wiglesworth v. Taylor, 239 Va. 603, 608,
391 S.E.2d 299, 303 (1990)).
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Wall, 99 Va. 353, 356, 38 S.E. 181, 182 (1901)).
59. Id. (quoting McNeir v. McNeir, 178 Va. 285, 290, 16 S.E.2d 632 633 (1941)).
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nonconforming features of a building renders the building in con-
formity for other purposes of the ordinance. 60 The landowner's
lot, created prior to the enactment of the current zoning ordin-
ance, did not comply with the width and total area requirements
of the current ordinance. 61 Similarly, the home situated on the
lot, built prior to the enactment of the current ordinance, did not
comply with the setback requirements. 62 Both of the nonconfor-
mities were deemed to be prior, lawful, nonconforming features.63
The landowner sought to construct an addition to the home pur-
suant to a provision of the zoning ordinance that permitted struc-
tural additions to nonconforming structures so long as .'[n]o por-
tion of the addition would be closer to a front or side lot line than
the existing structure."'64 The homeowner's proposed addition
would not have reduced the existing, nonconforming setback yar-
dage; the addition would, however, have resulted in a total lot
coverage in excess of that permitted by the ordinance. 65
The supreme court concluded that a variance for certain as-
pects of a zoning ordinance does not exempt the recipient lan-
downer from compliance with aspects of the ordinance that are
not expressly addressed by the variance.66 Quoting prior supreme
court rulings, the Goyonaga court reasserted that "'[v]ariances ex-
ist to relieve property owners from unnecessary or unreasonable
hardship resulting from strict application of zoning provisions."' 67
The court further explained that "assertion[s] that the variance
'establish[ed] new zoning regulations specific to this property' mi-
scharacterize[ ] the purpose and function of a variance."68 The
supreme court therefore upheld the lower court's ruling that the
Board of Zoning Appeals had not erred.69
60. 275 Va. 232, 235-36, 657 S.E.2d 153, 155 (2008).
61. Id. at 236, 657 S.E.2d at 155.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 236-37, 657 S.E.2d at 155 (quoting FALLS CHURCH, VA., CODE § 38-6(c)(3)
(Supp. 2006)).
65. Id. at 237, 657 S.E.2d at 155-56.
66. Id. at 242, 657 S.E.2d at 158.
67. Id. at 241, 657 S.E.2d at 158 (quoting Adams Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, 261 Va. 407, 415, 544 S.E.2d 315, 319 (2001)) (alteration in original).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 245, 657 S.E.2d at 160-61.
2008]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
E. Taxation
In Keswick Club, L.P. v. County of Albemarle, a private recrea-
tional club challenged the assessment of its property, which in-
cluded golf, swimming, spa, tennis, and exercise facilities.70 In
Keswick, the Supreme Court of Virginia noted that the Constitu-
tion of Virginia requires taxation of real property to be based on a
fair-market-value assessment. 71 The supreme court defined fair
market value as the "sale price when offered for sale 'by one who
desires, but is not obliged, to sell it, and is bought by one who is
under no necessity of having it."'72 A landowner seeking relief
from a purportedly excessive assessment must show that the as-
sessor's valuation is greater than fair market value.73
The Keswick Court noted that there are three recognized valu-
ation approaches available for consideration by taxing authori-
ties: the cost approach, the income approach, and the sales ap-
proach.74 According to the court:
Each of these approaches utilizes different characteristics of a prop-
erty to estimate fair market value, and each analyzes different ele-
ments of the property which would likely affect the price a potential
buyer would be willing to pay for the property on the open market.
Ideally, an appraisal should, if possible, derive its final determina-
tion of a property's value using all three approaches in order to max-
imize the likelihood that the valuation accurately reflects the proper-
ty's fair market value.7 5
Notwithstanding that a composite of the three approaches is
"ideal," the supreme court conceded that "a taxing authority may
determine that the use of one or more of these approaches is not
feasible."76 In such cases, the court affords a presumption of va-
lidity to the valuation "so long as the taxing authority 'consider[s]
and properly reject[s]' the other valuation- methods."77 An as-
sessment is not entitled to such a presumption of validity, howev-
70. 273 Va. 128, 132, 639 S.E.2d 243, 244-45 (2007).
71. Id. at 136, 639 S.E.2d at 247.
72. Id. (quoting Tuckahoe Woman's Club v. City of Richmond, 199 Va. 734, 737, 101
S.E.2d 571, 574 (1958)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 137, 639 S.E.2d at 248.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting Bd. of Supervisors v. HCA Health Servs. of Va., Inc., 260 Va. 317, 330,
535 S.E.2d 163, 170 (2000)).
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er, when the assessor "fail[s] to make an 'effort to acquire the da-
ta necessary to perform appraisals' based on the other approach-
es."78 As a result, the taxpayer challenging the assessment bears
a lower burden and must merely show that the assessment was
erroneous.
79
The Keswick Court found that the taxing authority's "categori-
cal application of the cost approach to the valuation of all golf
courses resulted in a failure by the county to consider and proper-
ly reject the income and sales approaches before solely utilizing
the cost approach in assessing the fair market value of Keswick
Club."80 Noting that the assessor "did not attempt to obtain the
data necessary to perform appraisals based on the income and
sales approaches," the supreme court sided with the club and re-
versed and remanded the case for application of the "less strin-
gent" standard of review.8 1
F. Prescription
In Johnson v. Debusk Farm, Inc., whether a prescriptive ease-
ment existed and whether a purchaser of the servient tract had
notice of the same were at issue.8 2 In addition to challenging the
easement, the servient tract owner, who had recently acquired
the property, filed a cross-bill against her predecessor in interest
citing breach of the general warranty covenant in her vesting
deed.83 The lower court determined that a prescriptive easement
had been properly established and, in dismissing the cross-bill,
deemed the servient tract owner to have been on notice of the
easement. 84
As the Supreme Court of Virginia recently reinforced in Ams-
tutz v. Everett Jones Lumber Corp., in order to establish a pre-
scriptive easement, the claimant must prove by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that his use was 'adverse, under a claim of right,
exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted, and with the knowledge
and acquiescence of the owner of the land over which it passes,
78. Id. (quoting HCA Health Servs., 260 Va. at 330, 535 S.E.2d at 170).
79. Id. at 141, 639 S.E.2d at 250.
80. Id. at 140, 639 S.E.2d at 250.
81. Id. at 140-41, 639 S.E.2d at 250.
82. 272 Va. 726, 727, 636 S.E.2d 388, 389 (2006).
83. Id. at 727-28, 636 S.E.2d at 389.
84. Id. at 728, 636 S.E.2d at 389.
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and that the use has continued for at least 20 years."'8 5 Affording
the trial court's decision great deference, the Johnson Court
turned to the evidence, which it reviewed in the light most favor-
able to the party seeking the easement. 86 In Johnson, the facts
revealed at the trial level showed that the dominant tract would
be "virtually land-locked" but for the right-of-way at issue, and
further that the right-of-way had been used by the dominant tract
in excess of thirty years.8 7 In fact, the servient tract owner testi-
fied to having observed the right-of-way during her property in-
spection prior to purchase.8 8 In light of the foregoing facts, the
Johnson Court affirmed the finding of the trial court because it
was supported by the evidence and was not plainly wrong.8 9 The
supreme court also noted that, under the trial court's findings,
the elements of a prescriptive easement had been satisfied ap-
proximately thirteen years prior to the current servient owner's
acquisition of her property. 90
G. Owners'Associations
1. Standing
In Westlake Properties, Inc. v. Westlake Pointe Property Owners
Ass'n, Inc., the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial
court's holding that an owners' association had standing to file
suit against the property developer and that individual property
owners comprising the association were not requisite parties to
the suit.9 1 In Westlake, a townhome owners' association brought
suit in conjunction with a "catastrophic failure" of the property's
septic system.92 The developer's declaration of covenants, condi-
tions, and restrictions imposed an obligation on the association to
maintain and repair the septic system.93 The association alleged,
inter alia, that the developer was negligent in constructing the
85. 268 Va. 551, 559, 604 S.E.2d 437, 441 (2004) (quoting Martin v. Moore, 263 Va.
640, 645, 561 S.E.2d 672, 675 (2002)); see also Johnson, 272 Va. at 730, 636 S.E.2d at 391.
86. Johnson, 272 Va. at 730, 636 S.E.2d at 390.
87. Id. at 728, 636 S.E.2d at 389-90.
88. Id. at 729, 636 S.E.2d at 390.
89. Id. at 731, 636 S.E.2d at 391.
90. Id.
91. See 273 Va. 107, 122, 639 S.E.2d 257, 266 (2007).
92. Id. at 114-15, 639 S.E.2d at 261-62.
93. Id. at 111-12, 639 S.E.2d at 260.
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septic system and breached both contract and warranty. 94 In re-
sponse, the developer argued that the association lacked standing
because the individual townhome owners owned the septic sys-
tem.95
The supreme court began its analysis with well-established
case law. Pursuant to Harbor Cruises, Inc. v. State Corp. Com-
mission, a party must possess "an immediate, pecuniary, and
substantial interest in the litigation" to have standing.96 The
Westlake Court easily found that the foregoing standing require-
ment was met, stating that "even though the Association did not
own the real property, the damage caused to the septic system by
the erosion of the slope injured the Association." 97 The supreme
court supported its finding by stating:
It is clear.., that the Association did not own the real property...
where the majority of the common fixtures that made up the original
septic system were located .... [I]t is also beyond dispute that the
Association owned, and was the party legally responsible for the
maintenance and repair of, the fixtures of the septic system that
served the entire development. [The developer's] assertion that the
individual property owners had the primary responsibility to main-
tain the septic system as a whole is simply contrary to clear and un-
ambiguous express provisions of the pertinent recorded documents
which require the individual property owners to maintain their indi-
vidual sewer lines between their townhomes and the common septic
system, but places responsibility for maintenance and repair of the
common fixtures ... exclusively with the Association. 9 8
Siding further with the Association, the supreme court rejected
the developer's contention that the individual townhome owners
were requisite parties. 99 The Westlake Court determined that, al-
though the individual property owners within the association
may have also had claims against the developer, the association's
claims "neither implicated nor imperiled any claim" on behalf of
those individual property owners.lOO
94. See id. at 115, 639 S.E.2d at 262.
95. Id.
96. 219 Va. 675, 676, 250 S.E.2d 347, 348 (1979); see also Westlake, 273 Va. at 120,
639 S.E.2d at 265.
97. Westlake, 273 Va. at 121, 639 S.E.2d at 265.
98. Id. at 120-21, 639 S.E.2d at 265.
99. Id. at 122, 639 S.E.2d at 266.
100. Id.
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2. Property Owners' Association Act Qualification Requirements
Dogwood Valley Citizens Ass'n v. Shifflett provided the Su-
preme Court of Virginia with the opportunity to clarify the quali-
fication requirements for owners' associations set forth in the
Property Owners' Association Act ("POAA").101 The association at
issue in Dogwood purported to levy special assessments against
property owners and thereafter filed warrants in debt against
those who did not pay the assessment. 102 In their defense, the al-
legedly delinquent property owners contended that the associa-
tion was not properly qualified under the POAA. 103
According to the POAA, a "property owners' association" is de-
fined as "an incorporated or unincorporated entity upon which re-
sponsibilities are imposed and to which authority is granted in
the declaration."104 The supreme court explained that "[q]uali-
fication as a property owners' association under the POAA re-
quires that a declaration recorded in the land records where the
development is located impose on an association both the power
to assess fees for road and common facilities maintenance and the
duty to perform such maintenance."105 In Dogwood, no such dec-
laration was recorded; however, the association argued that filing
articles of incorporation and bylaws in the land records was suffi-
cient for qualification purposes and that the assessment was
therefore justified. 106
The supreme court disagreed: "We reject the [association's] ar-
gument that the plain language of the definition of 'declaration'
includes instruments such as articles of incorporation and bylaws
if such documents are filed in the appropriate land records and
create either certain assessment authority or maintenance duties
for the property owners' association." 107 In providing the ratio-
nale for its conclusion, the supreme court noted that the POAA
101. 275 Va. 197, 200, 654 S.E.2d 894, 895 (2008); see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-508 to -
516.2 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
102. Dogwood, 275 Va. at 201, 654 S.E.2d at 896.
103. See id.
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-509 (Supp. 2008).
105. Dogwood, 275 Va. at 200, 654 S.E.2d at 895 (citing Anderson v. Lake Arrowhead
Civic Ass'n, 253 Va. 264, 271-72, 483 S.E.2d 209, 213 (1997)).
106. Id. at 202, 654 S.E.2d at 896.
107. Id.
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"allows unilateral action in only limited circumstances"108 and
that the association's proposed interpretation
would allow a property owners' association to acquire the right to is-
sue special assessments under the POAA merely by filing in the ap-
propriate land records a document, regardless of its nature, stating
that the association has the authority to assess property owners for
maintenance of common areas and the responsibility to maintain
those areas. 109
H. Co-Tenancy
In Daly v. Shepherd, the Supreme Court of Virginia added color
to Virginia Code section 8.01-31, which provides for an "account-
ing in equity... by one ... tenant in common.., for receiving
more than comes to his just share or proportion."11o In the con-
text of a suit for partition, the Daly Court considered one co-
tenant's claim for the fair market rental value based upon her co-
tenant's alleged "sole and exclusive" occupancy of the property.111
The facts revealed in the lower court showed that the non-
occupying co-tenant declined to move into the co-owned property
and relocated to another state.1 1 2 The occupying co-tenant ulti-
mately brought a suit for partition so as to own the entire interest
in the property.11 3
The supreme court set forth a new two-prong inquiry for de-
termining whether a non-occupying co-tenant is entitled to re-
ceive rent from an occupying co-tenant: (1) "[I]s the property
amenable to co-occupation?"; and (2) "[W]as there an exclusion or
ouster of the non-occupying co-tenant?"114 The Daly Court ans-
wered the first question in the affirmative, citing the nature of
the property-a residence with multiple bedrooms-as "amenable
to co-occupation."115 The court went on to find that there had
been no ouster, but rather a "choice" on behalf of the non-
108. Id. at 204, 654 S.E.2d at 897.
109. Id. at 203, 654 S.E.2d at 897.
110. 274 Va. 270, 273, 645 S.E.2d 485, 486 (2007) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-31
(Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008)).
111. Id. at 271-72, 645 S.E.2d at 485-86.
112. Id. at 272, 645 S.E.2d at 486.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 274, 645 S.E.2d at 487.
115. Id.
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occupying co-tenant not to inhabit the residence.116 As a result of
the application of its new two-prong test, the supreme court af-
firmed the trial court's denial of fair market rent from the occupy-
ing co-tenant. 117
I. Landlord/Tenant
Isbell v. Commercial Investment Associates presented the Su-
preme Court of Virginia with the issue of whether the Virginia
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act ("VRLTA") abrogates the
common-law rule that a landlord has no responsibility to main-
tain any portion of leased premises which are in a tenant's exclu-
sive control.ll8 The Isbell Court outlined the "well-settled" com-
mon-law rule:
Where the right of possession and enjoyment of the leased premises
passes to the lessee, the cases are practically agreed that, in the ab-
sence of concealment or fraud by the landlord as to some defect in
the premises, known to him and unknown to the tenant, the tenant
takes the premises in whatever condition they may be in, thus as-
suming all risk of personal injury from defects therein. 119
After falling down the stairs in his apartment, the Isbell tenant
sought to recover against the landlord under a negligence theory
for failure to inspect and maintain the staircase.120 The tenant
advanced the argument that a statutory cause of action was
created by the VRLTA's provisions, which permit tenants
to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of a
landlord's violation of the statutory duties to "[c]omply with the re-
quirements of applicable building and housing codes materially af-
fecting health and safety" and to "[m]ake all repairs and do whatever
is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable con-
dition." 12 1
The supreme court concluded:
[T]he General Assembly did not plainly manifest an intention, either
through express language or by necessary implication, to abrogate
116. Id. at 274-75, 645 S.E.2d at 487.
117. See id. at 275, 645 S.E.2d at 487.
118. 273 Va. 605, 609, 644 S.E.2d 72, 73 (2007).
119. Id. at 611, 644 S.E.2d at 74 (quoting Caudill v. Gibson Fuel Co., 185 Va. 233, 239-
40, 38 S.E.2d 465, 469 (1946)).
120. Id. at 609, 644 S.E.2d at 73.
121. Id. at 612, 644 S.E.2d at 74 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 55.248-13(A)(l)-(2) (Supp.
2008)).
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the common law and make a landlord liable in tort for a tenant's
personal injuries sustained on leased premises within the tenant's
control and possession as a result of the landlord's breach of duties
imposed by the [VRLTA]. 122
The court explained that "[i]nstead, the Act provides a compre-
hensive scheme of landlords' and tenants' contractual rights and
remedies."123 As a result, the common-law rule controlled, and
the supreme court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the landlord. 124
J. Contracts
In Boots, Inc. v. Singh, the Supreme Court of Virginia clarified
the rule for determining whether a liquidated damages clause in
a contract is invalid.125 The Boots parties entered into a real es-
tate purchase and sale agreement that was expressly contingent
upon the purchaser obtaining financing for the acquisition.126
The purchase agreement further provided that the earnest money
deposit would become non-refundable if the purchaser failed to
terminate the contract by the expiration of the financing contin-
gency period.127 Despite an extension of the contingency period,
the contract purchaser neither timely obtained proof of financing
nor affirmatively terminated the contract.128 The seller retained
the purchaser's earnest money deposit as liquidated damages.129
By the time the purchaser arranged for financing months later,
the seller had sold the property to a third party.130 Taking into
account the forfeited deposit and the proceeds received pursuant
to the third-party sale, the seller made a profit above the original
purchase price.131 On this basis, the purchaser argued that the
damages provision was invalid.132 Persuaded, the circuit court
122. Id. at 618, 644 S.E.2d at 78.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. 274 Va. 513, 515, 649 S.E.2d 695, 696 (2007).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 515-16, 649 S.E.2d at 696-97.
129. See id. at 516, 649 S.E.2d at 697.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 517, 649 S.E.2d at 697-98.
132. See id., 649 S.E.2d at 698.
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invalidated the liquidated damages provision as an "impermis-
sible penalty or forfeiture."133
The supreme court reversed and remanded the case, directing
the lower court to award the deposit to the seller.134 Emphasizing
the timing aspects of the existing rule of law, the Boots court cla-
rified that "a liquidated damages clause is invalid only when the
actual damages contemplated at the time of the agreement are
shown to be certain and not difficult to determine or the stipu-
lated amount is out of all proportion to the actual damages." 135
The purchaser in Boots neglected to present any evidence to indi-
cate that the deposit and probable loss were disproportionate at
the time of contract execution.1 36 In dicta, the supreme court
made reference to its previous enforcement of liquidated damages
clauses providing for 4.6% and 10% of the purchase price, noting
also that the clause at issue in Boots required only forfeiture of
the deposit, which was 3.3% of the purchase price.137
K. Restrictive Covenants
In the Supreme Court of Virginia case of Scott v. Walker, prop-
erty owners in a residential subdivision sought to enjoin nightly
and weekly rentals of a home within the subdivision.138 Restric-
tive covenants recorded against the property provided that "[n]o
lot shall be used except for residential purposes."139 Although the
covenants were silent as to renting, the complaining property
owners argued that the phrase 'residential purposes"' implied a
'duration of time"' dimension, unambiguously prohibiting rent-
ing. 140
After distinguishing several of its previous holdings, the su-
preme court found the covenant to be ambiguous:
[The covenant] is ambiguous as to whether a residential purpose is
viewed only in contradistinction to a business or commercial use;
133. Id. at 516, 649 S.E.2d at 697.
134. Id. at 518, 649 S.E.2d at 698.
135. Id. (citing O'Brian v. Langley School, 256 Va. 547, 551, 507 S.E.2d 363, 365
(1998)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 274 Va. 209, 212, 645 S.E.2d 278, 280 (2007).
139. Id. at 211, 645 S.E.2d at 280.
140. Id. at 213, 645 S.E.2d at 281.
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and, if not so limited, it is ambiguous both as to whether a residen-
tial purpose requires an intention to be physically present in a home
for more than a transient stay and as to whether the focus of the in-
quiry is on the owner's use of the property or the renter's use. 14 1
The supreme court then construed the ambiguous covenant 'in
favor of the free use of property and against restrictions"' and
concluded that the nightly and weekly rentals of the home did not
violate the covenant.142
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGISLATIVE ACTS
A. Eminent Domain
The newly enacted Virginia Code section 1-219.1, entitled "Li-
mitations on eminent domain," begins by stating: "The right to
private property being a fundamental right, the General Assem-
bly shall not pass any law whereby private property shall be tak-
en or damaged for public uses without just compensation."143 The
new statute sets out to clarify the acceptable parameters of public
use.144 To this end, it sets forth six instances that qualify as "pub-
lic uses," including those instances where:
(i) the property is taken for the possession, ownership, occupation,
and enjoyment of property by the public or a public corporation; (ii)
the property is taken for construction, maintenance, or operation of
public facilities by public corporations or by private entities provided
that there is a written agreement with a public corporation providing
for use of the facility by the public; (iii) the property is taken for the
creation or functioning of any public service corporation, public ser-
vice company, or railroad; (iv) the property is taken for the provision
of any authorized utility service by a government utility corporation;
(v) the property is taken for the elimination of blight provided that
the property itself is a blighted property; or (vi) the property taken is
in a redevelopment or conservation area and is abandoned or the ac-
quisition is needed to clear title where one of the owners
141. Id. at 217, 645 S.E.2d at 283.
142. Id. at 218, 645 S.E.2d at 283 (quoting Schwarzchild v. Welborne, 186 Va. 1052,
1058, 45 S.E.2d 152, 155 (1947)).
143. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-219.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2008). Note that this section was originally
added as Virginia Code section 1-237.1 by Act of Apr. 4, 2007, chs. 882, 901, 926, 2007 Va.
Acts 2392-93, 2483-84, 2597-98, but was renumbered as section 1-219.1 pursuant to the
direction of the Virginia Code Commission. See id.
144. Id.
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agrees to such acquisition or the acquisition is by agreement of all
the owners. 14 5
The General Assembly expressly prohibited the use of eminent
domain unless "the public interest dominates the private gain
and.. . the primary purpose is not private financial gain, private
benefit, an increase in tax base or tax revenues, or an increase in
employment."146 Pursuant to section 1-219.1(E), property owners
are entitled to challenge a proposed exercise of eminent domain
on the grounds that (1) it is not actually a public use, (2) the con-
demning authority's purported public use is a pretext for unau-
thorized use, or (3) the taking violates the prohibitions estab-
lished in the previously referenced subsection (D).147
B. Landlord/Tenant
Newly enacted Virginia Code section 55-225.3(A)(5) imposes
new statutory maintenance obligations on landlords with respect
to mold conditions.148 Landlords are now required to maintain
their dwelling units so as "to prevent the accumulation of mois-
ture and the growth of mold and to promptly respond to any no-
tice[ ]" from tenants alleging a mold condition. 149 A parallel obli-
gation is imposed on tenants by section 55-225.4(8), which
requires that tenants "[ulse reasonable efforts to maintain the
dwelling unit and any other part of the premises that he occupies
in such a condition as to prevent accumulation of moisture and
the growth of mold and to promptly notify the landlord of any
moisture accumulation that occurs or of any visible evidence of
mold discovered. . . ."150
In the event of a material mold condition in a dwelling unit,
newly enacted Virginia Code section 55-225.9 authorizes lan-
dlords to require that tenants temporarily vacate their units to
allow for remediation. 151 This section makes landlords responsi-
ble for the costs of remediation, except where the tenant has
145. Id.
146. Act of Apr. 4, 2007, chs. 882, 901, 926, 2007 Va. Acts 2392, 2483, 2597 (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 1-219.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 2008)).
147. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-219.1(E) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
148. See id. § 55-225.3(A)(5) (Supp. 2008).
149. Id.
150. Id. § 55-225.4(8) (Supp. 2008).
151. Id. § 55-225.9 (Supp. 2008).
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caused the mold condition.152 While the tenant must continue to
pay rent during the period of vacation, the landlord must provide
the tenant with a comparable unit or hotel room at the landlord's
expense. 153
Newly enacted section 8.01-226.12 of the Virginia Code ad-
dresses liability for damages in a tenant's personal injury or
wrongful death action relating to a purported mold condition in a
dwelling unit.154 Section 8.01-226.12(B) absolves both the lan-
dlord and managing agent from liability "if the mold condition is
caused solely by the negligence of the tenant."155
Virginia Code section 8.01-226.7 addresses liability for damag-
es arising from another noxious condition-lead-based paint.156
In addition to the prior-existing obligation to disclose lead-based
paint information prior to a tenant's signing a lease, the 2007
amendment to subsection (B)(5) imposes an ongoing obligation on
the landlord to provide tenants with written disclosure of new in-
formation acquired by the landlord throughout the term of a
lease.157
C. Virginia Condominium Act
New Virginia Code section 55-79.75:2 prevents condominium
unit owners' associations from prohibiting the display of the
American flag by unit owners, unless prohibited by the condomi-
nium documents.158 Notwithstanding the foregoing, this section
authorizes associations to establish reasonable restrictions as to
the flag's display.159 Pursuant to changes to section 55-79.90, flag
prohibitions, limitations, and restrictions contained within the
condominium documents must be disclosed in the condominium's
public offering statement.160
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id. § 8.01-226.12 (Supp. 2008).
155. Id. § 8.01-226.12(B) (Supp. 2008).
156. Id. § 8.01-226.7 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
157. Id. § 8.01-226.7(B)(5) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
158. Id. § 55-79.75:2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
159. Id. § 55-79.75:2(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
160. Id. § 55-79.90(A)(14) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
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In the context of conversion condominiums, additions to Virgin-
ia Code section 55-79.94 permit a disabled or elderly tenant in
some cases to assign his right to purchase his unit to a govern-
ment agency, housing authority, or nonprofit corporation that will
then lease the unit back to the tenant. 161
In the context of commercial condominiums, revisions to sec-
tion 55-79.95 dispense with the requirement that deposits be es-
crowed in conjunction with the sale of a unit. 162
D. Land Use
The General Assembly augmented Virginia Code section 15.2-
2259(A) to establish a specific approval framework for plats, site
plans, and plans of development involving commercial real estate
in localities with populations of more than 90,000 residents. 163
Modifications to Virginia Code section 15.2-2307 prohibit zoning
ordinances from slating a building for removal solely on the
grounds of zoning nonconformity, so long as (1) such building was
built in accordance with a building permit and subsequently re-
ceived a certificate of occupancy, or (2) the property owner has
paid taxes for more than fifteen years. 164 While this section pre-
viously permitted zoning ordinances to allow damaged, non-
conforming buildings to be rebuilt without a building permit,
changes to this section now require that zoning ordinances ex-
pressly include this right.165 The ordinances, however, do permit
owners "to repair, rebuild, or replace [a damaged] building to
eliminate or reduce ... non-conform[ities] ... without the need to
obtain a variance" if the damage was caused by a natural disas-
ter. 166
Section 15.2-2286 of the Virginia Code allows zoning ordin-
ances to impose certain penalties for a zoning violation convic-
tion.167 Additions to section 15.2-2286(5) increase the available
161. Id. § 55-79.94(B) (Supp. 2008).
162. See id. § 55-79.95(B) (Supp. 2008). The revisions create exceptions for "the decla-
rant of a condominium consisting of more than 50 units." Id.
163. Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 855, 2008 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-2259(A) (Repl. Vol. 2008)).
164. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2307 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
165. Compare id., with id. § 15.2-2307 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
166. Id. § 15.2-2307 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
167. Id. § 15.2-2286(4), (5) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
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penalties for violations of a specific subset of ordinances-those
which limit the number of unrelated persons occupying a single
family residential dwelling.168
By amending Virginia Code section 15.2-2208, the General As-
sembly provided zoning administrators with the authority to file
a memorandum of lis pendens on the basis of zoning violations.169
Pursuant to modifications to this section and section 8.01-268,
any lis pendens expires after 180 days.17o Unless a lis pendens
filed pursuant to the new legislation describes the zoning viola-
tion, a bona fide purchaser is protected against its filing by the
2008 modifications to section 8.01-268.171
Sections 15.2-2244 and 15.2-2244.1 of the Virginia Code re-
quire localities to enact legislation that specifically allows subdi-
viding a single lot for conveyance to a family member, subject to
certain limitations. 172 One such limitation is that the subdivided
parcel must be encumbered by a restrictive covenant prohibiting
conveyance to a non-family member for a period of fifteen
years. 173 Localities may now reduce or provide exceptions to the
fifteen-year restriction in accordance with modifications to Vir-
ginia Code section 15.2-2244.1.174 In addition, stepchildren are
now included within the definition of family members who may
take advantage of the subdivision allowance.175
E. Road Maintenance
Pursuant to the new right granted by Virginia Code section 55-
50.3, a property owner who accesses his property via a public
road which is no longer maintained by the locality is permitted to
maintain, repair, or improve the road at his expense. 176 The
maintaining property owner is not required to secure the express
168. Id. § 15.2.2286(5) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
169. Act of Mar. 12, 2008, ch. 583, 2008 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-2208(B) (Repl. Vol. 2008)).
170. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01.268(A) (Supp. 2008); Id. § 15.2-2208 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
171. Id. § 8.01-268(A) (Supp. 2008).
172. Id. §§ 15.2-2244(A), -2244.1 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
173. Id. § 15.2-2244.1 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
174. Id.
175. Id. § 15.2-2244 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
176. Id. § 55-50.3 (Supp. 2008).
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permission of other property owners who may be using the impli-
cated road. 177
F. Doctrine of Worthier Title
Through the passage of Virginia Code section 55-14.1, the Gen-
eral Assembly of Virginia, like so many of its counterparts, offi-
cially abolished the doctrine of worthier title in the common-
wealth as both a rule of law and of construction.178 The operation
of the doctrine often resulted in unexpected and unintended re-
sults.179 In light of its abolition, inter vivos and testamentary
gifts to heirs will be interpreted more predictably.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most publicized holding of the Supreme Court of
Virginia discussed in this article is Fancher v. Fagella. This deci-
sion will change the way disputes between neighboring property
owners regarding encroaching vegetation are assessed.S0 In
another significant holding, Daly v. Shepherd, the Supreme Court
of Virginia formulated a new rule of law applicable to co-
tenancies.1S1 An opposite holding in Isbell v. Commercial Invest-
ment Associates, however, would have had far more reaching im-
plications for residential landlords in the commonwealth to main-
tain leased premises.18 2 Keswick Club, L.P. v. County of
Albemarle reassures property owners that courts in the common-
wealth will hold taxing authorities to high standards when set-
ting fair market value for assessment purposes.18 3 Boots v. Singh
gives drafters of liquidated damages provisions in real estate con-
tracts comfort that they will be enforced,184 and Scott v. Walker
reminds practitioners to deftly draft recorded covenants to ensure
clearly expressed intent.185
177. Id.
178. See Act of Mar. 9, 2007, ch. 215, 2007 Va. Acts 304 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-14.1 (Supp. 2008)).
179. See, e.g., Braswell v. Braswell, 195 Va. 971, 975-79, 81 S.E.2d 560, 562-64 (1954).
180. See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 125-37 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 138-42 and accompanying text.
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For another two years running, the Virginia General Assembly
was active in passing legislation addressing land use and lan-
dlord/tenant matters. Several bills modifying the Virginia Con-
dominium Act again made their way into law as well. In some-
what of a departure from the notion that private property is a
fundamental right, the General Assembly enacted detailed emi-
nent domain legislation to clarify the circumstances under which
condemnation is proper and lawful. When coupled with the possi-
ble implications of the Target case, the new eminent domain sta-
tutory provisions have the potential to significantly alter con-
demnation proceedings in the commonwealth.

